ABSTRACT:Using empirical market data from brand rivalry in a retail ground-coffee market, we model each idiosyncratic brand'spricing behaviour using the restriction that marketing strategies depend only on profit-relevant state variables, and use the Genetic Algorithm to search for co-evolved equilibria, where each profit-maximizing brand manager is a stimulus-response automaton, responding to past prices in the asymmetric oligopolistic market. Part of a growing study of repeated interactions and oligopolistic behaviour using the GA.
INTRODUCTION
We use simulated evolution to explore oligopolistic behaviour in a (retail) market with up to four strategic sellers, comparing our simulation results with historical data derived from a retail market for ground, vacuum-sealed coffee beans. We find that our boundedly rational sellers perform well (as measured by their average weekly profits) compared to their historical counterparts, despite their limited memory and constrained marketing actions.
Significant features of our work are: first, our agents are heterogeneous: they respond idiosyncratically to others' actions, theyhav e distinct costs, face distinct demand curves, and so earn distinct profits. Forthis reason, we cannot ignore the identities of the separate players, which would be convenient, were the players identical. Second, we use the Genetic Algorithm (GA) to model the players' learning. To avoid "social learning" (Vriend 2000) , when players drawn from a single population pass information to their "offspring" through the genotype (an extra-market mechanism), we use distinct populations for the four strategic sellers, which precludes extra-market communication and learning. Third, we use stochastic sampling (commonly knowasMonte Carlo sampling, see Judd 1998 ) to generate a distribution of marketing behaviours across the sellers: giventhe stochastic nature of the GA, and the complexity of the genotypes and phenotypes, we use distinct random seeds to generate 50 distinct outcomes.
Computer scientists have dev eloped machine learning, such as the GA (Holland 1976 (Holland , 1992 Mitchell 1996 ; Goldberg1989) and classifier systems (Holland 1976 (Holland , 1992 as means of optimising -of finding the argmax of functions not amenable to calculusbased methods of solution. Social scientists have used and developed these tools (Marks 1989 (Marks , 2002 Arifovic 1993 ) but less as optimisers, and more as generators of "adaptive plans" or "structures that perform well" in complexsystems (Holland 1975 (Holland , 1992 , by modelling "adaptive economic agents" (Holland & Miller 1992 ) that interact. This chapter demonstrates a use of the GA in this spirit.
OLIGOPOLISTIC THEORY
Rivalry among retail brand managers in a market for vacuum-sealed ground coffee beans can be seen to possess characteristics that clearly reflect the oligopolistic nature of the repeated interaction: the brands are seen as imperfect substitutes by the buyers, the sales of anyone brand, if stimulated by heightened marketing actions, will negatively impact on the sales of other brands, and there is no single going market price for coffee. We model Bertrand asymmetric competition among firms, competing with price (and other marketing actions) rather than quantity.
We hav e access to 78 weeks of supermarket-scanner market data for a city in the U.S. mid-west by supermarket chain. The marketing actions (price, coupons, aisle display,advertising) remain unchanged for sevendays, from midnight Saturday,for all brands, a property that lends itself to simulation modelling on a digital computer.
One of us (Cooper) has developed a market model, Casper,which calculates, given all of the nine brands' marketing actions, the volume of sales of each brand, the brands' revenues and profits (Cooper & Nakanishi 1988) . 1 The brands differ not only in the demand response of the market (each of their price elasticities of demand is distinct), but also in their costs. The brands are truly hereogeneous, as seen in Tables 1 and 2 Casper provides the equivalent of the one-shot payoffs for each of the brands, modelled as playing a repeated game.
2
Although each brand manager must choose the set of next week'smarket actions in ignorance of the other brands' action next week, this and preceding weeks' actions are observable by all brands. So the brands can choose to remember the actions of their rivals for one, two, or more weeks. Their depth of memory is a measure of their bounded rationality: an unboundedly rational player would choose to forget nothing, and to use all remembered information including its weekly profits in deciding what marketing actions to undertakenextweek.
But the brand managers do not have unfettered freedom to choose their marketing actions, since the policies of the supermarket chain constrain them, in twoways. Some actions (including a price well belowthe "shelf price") result in much higher sales, and higher profits (the lower margins are more than offset by higher volumes of sales). The chain constrains use of these so-called "promotional" actions. First, no brand may use a promotional action set twoweeks successively.S econd, only one brand may use a promotional action set in anyweek. The chain acts as the moderator among the brand 1 . We can makea vailable the C sources for our programs and the 75 weeks of historical market data on request. 2. With up to four hereogeneous players, each facing a set of up to eight possible actions, the asymmetric (8 × 8 × 8 × 8) payoffmatrix is much too large to reproduce here.
managers, who each propose their next week'saction set and acquiesce in the supermarket'schoice of which brand may promote next week.
Competing against each other,the brand managers are trying to maximise their av erage weekly profits. The supermarket chain is competing against other chains for sales, although we do not model this rivalry explicitly here. Instead, we model the supermarket as trying to maximise "total category volume" of coffee sales. The reason is that coffee is one of manysupermarket categories, but one that might attract more customers to the chain, and so help to sell higher volumes across manycategories. We model supermarket moderation in several ways, as discussed in detail below.
The competition among brand managers is asymmetric, because each of the brands is distinct, with distinct price elasticities of demand, distinct unit costs of provision, and distinct responses to the market. Moreover, solution of the Nash equilibrium of the oneweek game, let alone solution of Nash equilibria in the repeated game, is not amenable to calculus-based, closed-form techniques. 3 There are nine brand rivals in the chain we focus on, although only four are engaged in what we might call a "rivalrous dance" by altering their marketing actions every week. Figure 1 shows the behaviour of the three major strategic brands, and one minor one.
There are twomain purposes of our research. First, we wish to calibrate and validate our model'sbehaviour to the historical data. To this end, we use the asymmetries implicit in Casper to model the brands' sales, revenues, costs, and profits in anyweek, givenall brands' market actions that week. We allowthe model to run for 50 weeks, with up to four "strategic brands" altering their marketing actions from week to week, in response to the state of the market (defined as the set of all players' marketing actions) the previous week. We look for several measures of the simulated competition: weekly profits, weekly Total Category Volume of coffee sales, and the marketing actions employed by the four strategic players.
The marketing actions include price, coupons, aisle display,and flier advertising. Historically,brands' prices varied from $1.50/lb to $3/lb, with promotional prices below $2.25/lb.C oupons reduce the price paid at check-out, and are measured by percentage of stores in the chain that distribute coupons for that brand that week. We net the impact of coupons out of the retail price to simplify the action space. Similarly,aisle display and flier advertising are reported as percentage of stores in the chain that include them for any brand in anyweek. In practice, as discussed above,the store permits only one brand to promote itself anyweek, and we see a consistent pattern in coupons, aisle display,and flier advertising: only one promoted brand per week.
We could allowthe adaptive brand managers of the model to choose their price from anybetween 150 and 300 cents per pound, and anypercentage of aisle displays and flier advertising, but in practice we believe,first, that this degree of freedom is not necessary to replicate historical performance, and, second, that the practical difficulties of simulating this (such as a huge number of degrees of freedom in the definition of "market state", and the need to execute Casper each simulated week instead of using a much faster compiled look-up table) militate against it.
Instead, we use the historical data to identify,first, four sets, and, second, eight sets of brand-specific actions which are representative ofthose chosen overthe first 50 weeks of data. Later,weuse eight action sets that are identical across the four strategic brands, and find similar results.
The second purpose of our research is to see whether our boundedly rational artificial brand managers can surpass the performance of their historical counterparts, as measured by their weekly profits, handicapped as theyare by,first, simple one-week memory,and, two, constrained choice of marketing actions. Necessarily,since we do not have access to actual historical brand managers in order to pit them against our artificial brand managers in a laboratory setting, we must be content with closed-loop experiments, where are artificial brand managers respond to the unfolding history of past rivalries, but where the historical actions cannot respond to our artificial agents' actions. We argue belowthat both aims are attained.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. After adiscussion of the GA, we describe our historical market data, and then describe the results of a set of computer experiments, as we increase the number of strategic brands from three to four,and the number of possible marketing actions per brand from four to eight. We present the openloop results of playing our best co-evolved artificial brands against history,and introduce the Holyfield-Tyson effect of pitting more evolved agents against less evolved agents. We discuss the implications of our results for insights into Managerial Learning.
BORROWING FROM NAT URE: THE GENETIC ALGORITHM Axelrod (1987) modelled players in his discrete repeated Prisoner'sDilemma (RPD) game as stimulus-response automata, where the stimulus was the state of the game, defined as both players' actions overthe previous several moves, and the response was the next period'saction (or actions). That is, he modelled the game as a state-space game (Fudenberg&Tirole 1992, Slade 1995), in which past play influences current and future actions, not because it has a direct effect on the game environment (the payofffunction) butbecause all (or both) players believe that past play matters. Axelrod'smodel focused attention on a smaller class of "Markov"or"state-space" strategies, in which past actions influence current play only through their effect on a state variable that summarises the direct effect of the past on the current environment (the payoffs). With state-space games, the state summarises all history that is payoff-relevant, and players' strategies are restricted to depend only on the state and (perhaps) the time.
We hav e been using versions of the GA since 1988 to explore oligopolistic behaviour. 4 As we describe above,wemodel the artificial brand managers as stimulus−response automata, in effect, where the stimulus is this week'smarket state (defined by the marketing actions of all players, and particularly the four strategic brands), and the response is the brand'sproposed market actions next week. The eventual market actions per brand are the outcome of a moderating process performed by the supermarket chain, responding to the four proposals of the brand managers.
We use the GA to search simultaneously for better automata for each of the four strategic brands, using their weekly profits as a measure of performance or fitness. Each brand manager is modelled as a binary string. If there are eight possible marketing actions to choose from (correlating aisle display and flier advertising with promotional prices), then we can use three bits on the string to code for next week'smarketing action.
Howmanytriples are sufficient for the model? With four strategic players, each with eight possible marketing actions, there are a mp possible states (Midgleyetal. 1997), where a =the number of actions (8) , m =the number of weeks remembered (1), and p = the number of strategic players (4), a total of 4,096 possible states, each state mapping to atriple of bits on the artificial player'sbit-string "chromosome", which requires each string to be 12,288 bits long. Adding an additional 12 bits for the "phantom memory" at the first of the 50 weeks (to endogenise the initial conditions of the brand'sbelief in the previous week'smarket state) givesus12,300 bits per string. This work is a generalisation of Axelrod (1987) and Marks (1992) , and uses the ability of the GA to search the highly disjoint space of strategies, as Fudenberg&Levine (1998) have suggested.
As is well known (see Goldberg, 1989 , Mitchell 1996 , or the second edition of Holland 1992), the GA borrows from our understanding of evolution to search for solutions to problems not easily solved otherwise. An initial population of solutions is generated; the fitness score of each individual is determined; a subset of individuals is elected to be the "parents" of the next generation; the "crossover" of pairs of parents is simulated; and each bit is flipped from zero to one or vice versa ("mutated") with a small probability (here 1%). The fitness of each member of the newpopulation is determined. And the process repeats until convergence.
The GA has been used by engineers as an optimisation tool. Social scientists have used it in a slightly different way: as a means of simulating co-evolution. In our model, each brand manager learns from its rivals' behaviour,and from its rivals' responses to its ownactions. This mutual leaning means that the competitive environment changes, even as each artificial brand manager learns to compete more effectively.A saresult, there is no necessary increase in weekly profits, evenasthe GA winnows the succeeding generations of their worst performing strings.
Co-evolution requires a separate population for each of the strategic players. 5 A single population would allowextra-market communication and learning to occur via the genetic operations of selection and cross-over. Not only would this be illegalunder antitrust laws, but such social learning (Vriend 2000) is not what we want to model. Necessarily,four separate populations requires a much more complexGAprogram, but only a co-evolving GA is appropriate. We extensively rewrote the GA software (GAucsd, based on John Grefenstette'sGENESIS package) (Schraudolph & Grefenstette 1992) to allowthe simultaneous simulation of up to four populations of agents (modelled as bit strings).
We use a population size of 25, each string being 12,300 bits long, with four populations. 6 This is a non-trivial simulation, but we manage to obtain 2,500 generations, each of 5.5 million weekly interactions, every 50 minutes on a Mac G5 dual-2Ghz Unix workstation. 
THE HISTORICAL DAT A :THE RETAIL GROUND-COFFEE MARKET
The data refer to a local U.S. retail market for ground-caffeinated coffee. There are nine brands or players. Table 1 givesthe average prices ($/lb) and market shares for each of the nine. Table 2 presents further data on the heterogeneity of the strategic players: their own-price elasticities of market share and their Average Variable Costs ( AVC). Figure 1 shows the historical prices (top half) and quantity of sales (bottom half) by brand over75 weeks. The solid lines map the prices and sales of the three strategic brands, Folgers, Maxwell House, and CFON; the dotted lines map the other brands. The data are aggregated on a supermarket chain. As mentioned above,each marketing action comprises four "marketing instruments":
1. prices (the price that week of the brand);
2. flier features (the percentage of stores in the chain featuring the brand'sitem in their distributed advertising);
3. in-store aisle displays (the percentage of stores in the chain featuring the brand's item as an aisle display); and 4. coupons, which are distributed to households in the district, for redemption of the brand'sproduct at the supermarket chain. We adjusted the price in anyweek by the percentage of coupons distributed.
COMPUTER EXPERIMENTS
We model the brand managers as artificial agents. The computational experimenter can control the agents'
• information (what theyknowwhen);
• learning (howinformation about their own and others' behaviour alters their future responses);
• degree of bounded rationality (in particular,their memory of past weeks' actions and outcomes, perhaps aggregated into coarser partitions);
• sets of possible actions (their deterministic responses to the perceivedstate of the market); and
• payoffs (which, liketheir information, learning, memory,partitioning, and actions, are asymmetric).
Simulation, although it cannot in general establish necessity,does enable exploration of the sufficient conditions for the emergence of particular aggregate market phenomena, givenplayers' micro behaviour.
FirstResults
This chapter builds on work reported in Midgleyetal. (1997). There we considered the three most interactive players in the market: Folgers, Maxwell House, and Chock Full O Nuts (CFON). We allowed each agent four action sets, as derivedfrom an analysis of their historical prices and other marketing actions. Our intention was to pit the three strategic brands against each other,while the other brands were unchanging or non-strategic players, in order to examine the coev olution of the three agents' behaviour.W ewould need to distinguish convergence of behaviour (phenotype) from structure (genotype).
We used the Casper market model to derive the three asymmetric 4 × 4 × 4payoff matrices for the three strategic players. The payoffmatrix indicates anybrand'sweekly profit for each of the 64 combinations of price giveninT able 3, giventhe non-strategic prices of the other six brands ($/lb) ( With one-week memory,the agents were modelled as bit strings of length 2 × 4 3 + 6= 134 bits. (The 6 bits of phantom memory endogenise initial conditions: each agent has four possible actions coding to 2 bits, and there are three strategic players.)
Each agent played a 50-round game with each possible combination of the other twoplayers. The GA used 25 mappings (or strings) per population for each agent. Therefore, testing each generation required 8125 50-round games, or 325 games per string per generation. Each agent had complete information of all previous actions in each 50-round game, but not others' weekly profits (payoffs). Figure 2 shows three patterns and average weekly profits with three distinct populations. For most of the runs, the agents' behaviour is very similar (Folgers and CFON pricing at an Every Day LowPricer (EDLP); Maxwell House exhibiting Wide Pulsing (WP). In Pattern 3, CFON is exhibiting Promote to the Max (PttM).
Consult Midgleyetal. (1997) for a discussion of the patterns of behaviour of the unconstrained and constrained brands, and the issue of demand saturation overtime that the single-week estimates of Casper evoke.A fter constraining the brands (as discussed above)and accounting for demand saturation, our three-brand, four-action model generates patterns of behaviour similar to Figure 1: Figure2: Three Agents, Four Actions.
hundred generations, we decided that one way to demonstrate the extent to which the agents had learnt to act effectively was to use the most profitable agent by brand from the hundredth generation and play it against the history of play of the other strategic brands. In order to do this, we had to partition the historical actions into four intervals for each of the three strategic brands. We measured performance by the average profits overthe seventy-fiveweek history. ForFolgers and CFON the agents improvedontheir historical performance, but Maxwell House sometimes did worse, evenonaverage. But this was an "open-loop" simulation: the historical managers had responded to the historical actions of all others, buthere could not respond to the agents' actions. Nonetheless, our very simple agents generated reasonable performance in a noisy environment.
Fo ur Strategic Players
Previously,wemodelled the oligopoly with three strategic players, each with four possible actions, remembering one week back. As discussed above,the agents were modelled as bit strings of length 134 bits. To improve the realism of the simulation, we increase the number of strategic brands to four,byincluding Hills Bros. This increases the bit-string length from 134 bits to 520 bits. 7 We chose Hills Bros., despite its small market share, as the fourth strategic agent, because the fourth largest brand (Master Blend) is not independent of Maxwell House, and so their strategic actions could be orchestrated by the owner.
The results of introducing the fourth strategic brand are striking. Even though Hills Bros. has a small market share (4%), its introduction is quite significant. The market changes in significant, complex, and asymmetric ways. There are changes in the other brands' behavior as well as in other brands' average weekly profits. Figure 3 shows three patterns and weekly profits which comprise 38 of 50 Monte Carlo runs. The newstrategic agent apparently takes up some of the fixed number of opportunities for major promotions, and has differing competitive impacts on the other brands. Surprisingly,the total weekly profits of the first three brands rise when a fourth player is introduced, at least for the 40-odd patterns of Figures 2 and 3 . What these simulations demonstrate is that a small player (as measured by market share) isn'tnecessarily insignificant strategically.I nPattern 1, Maxwell House is exhibiting High Pricer (HP), and in Pattern 3, Shelf Price (ShP).
Eight Actions per Player
Heretofore the strategic agents (whether three or four) have been constrained by the four possible actions, chosen from the historically observed actions of the actual brand managers. In effect, the agents were givenachoice of pricing high or low, with minor variation around the twopositions, and theywere constrained by the corporate memory and prior learning of the actual brand managers, who had, we assume, learned not to price too high (and sell very little) or too low(and earn little and perhaps spark a price war).
We wanted to increase the choices of the agents. The simplest way was to double the number of possible actions per agent from four to eight. The effect of this on the bitstring length will depend on the number of strategic agents: for three agents, with one- Figure3:,Four Agents, Four Historical Actions -Hundredth Generation week memory,allowing eight possible actions instead of four increases the length from 134 bits to 1,545; for four agents, the length increases from 520 bits to 12,300 bits. 8 By increasing the number of actions to eight, we hoped to give our agents the opportunity to demonstrate that the four actions used earlier were robust, and that our assumption of a mature oligopoly were correct, at least in terms of the combinations of prices and other marketing actions encountered.
Moving to eight possible actions, especially including some beyond the observed range of actions of the historical brand managers, introduces the possibility of the agents learning anewwhat was embodied in the historical range: not to price too high or too low. Table 5 : actions subject to store moderation.)
After four generations, starting from a uniform distribution of actions (because the bit strings are chosen randomly to begin with, apart from filtering against the actions of promoting twoweeks in succession), we see that the frequencies of actions are still almost uniform. After 100 generations, however, the agents have focussed on only twoorthree main patterns of interaction, with manyfewer than eight possible actions used frequently: agents have co-learnt the twoorthree actions that are most profitable, givenothers' behaviour.T he actions are brand-specific.
Specifically,with three strategic agents: CFON is pulsing between Shelf Price (high) and Promotional Price (low). Folgers exhibits three pulsing patterns: P2 -pulsing three actions, P1 -more diverse pulsing, with four actions, and P3 -pulsing with two actions. Maxwell House exhibits a less dynamic choice of Every Day LowPrice, and avoids the store constraints. CFON is pulsing with twoaction: wide or narrow.
From a 50-run Monte Carlo simulation of four agents and eight possible actions, we observeinFigure 5 for 44 runs that the four agents exhibit different behaviour: Folgers and CFON showWide Pulsing, from high to low, promotional prices (indicated by the 
Figure5: Four Agents, Eight Historical Actions -2500th Generation
Overall, we can say that, with the eight possible actions of Table 5 , a greater degree of homogeneity emerges, with 44 of 50 Monte Carlo runs being identical. Moreover, adding a fourth strategic agent increases the degree of competition in the market, which is here reflected in lower average profits for the first three brands, as well as different behaviour.
Moderation in the runs of Figure 5 is achievedrandomly (by a "zero-intelligence" chain moderator), but we explored changing this in twoways: first, by altering the possible actions of Table 5 by eliminating the lowest prices, and, second, by estimating from the historical data just howmoderation was achievedand the chain'spreferences across brands revealed. Wedonot report these experiments in detail here, but brands' profits fell, as did the volume of coffee sold.
When we repeated the open-loop plays between the best of the co-evolved three agents with eight possible action and the historical brand managers, we found that the best agents clearly outperformed their historical counterparts: for Folgers by 156%, for MH by 32%, and for CFON by 42%.
The Frankenstein Effect: Agents that showed only a fewbehaviours in the coev olutionary "lab" were able to evince a wider repertoire when faced with a more variable environment (the history of actual managers' behavior). Wedub this the Frankenstein effect because the artificially bred agents were more interesting in the wild than in the lab.
The Holyfield-Tyson Effect:
The artificial agents "learn" through application of the evolutionary techniques of the GA. This is clear when the agents are solutions to a static problem, as has been the most usual application of GA techniques in, say,engineering. It is also the case that the first application of GAsineconomics (Axelrod 1987 ) was static, evenifstochastic: Axelrod used GAsagainst a non-evolving but mixed-strategy niche of algorithms derivedfrom the early But Marks (1992) and others following have bred artificial agents against each other, aprocess that Marks called "bootstrapping" and biologists term "co-evolution".
Against a static environment, progress of the artificial agents is readily revealed by their improving fitness scores, but against a dynamic environment comprised of like artificial agents, scores may not rise from generation to generation. Tw o questions: Do highly co-evolved players become effete? Will a naïveoutperform a sophisticate?
Apart from the growth in average weekly profits, there are at least twofurther ways to demonstrate that the artificial natural selection has improvedthe agents' performances. In our earlier work we attempted to showthe greater competence of our artificial agents by pitting them against the historical histories of play of their opponents, but some criticism has been made that this overstates the skills of the artificial agents and understates the skills of the historical agents, who have noopportunity to respond to the actions of the artificial agent: their plays are given, or open-loop.
Here we attempt to showhow the artificial agents have learnt by taking agents after 2,500 trials (100 generations) and playing them against not the frozen movesoftheir historical opponents, but the agents after only 200 trials (8 generations): aprocess we have termed pitting a "sophisticated" agent against "naïve" agents. Howtoshowthat the co-evolved agents are learning to respond better (are truly fitter)? Previously: we considered the mean weekly profits. Now: in turn we replace the best naïve(at 8 generations) Folgers (respectively,Maxwell House, and CFON) string with the best sophisticate (after 100 generations) Folgers (respectively,Maxwell House and CFON) string.
The procedure followed was:
1. After 8generations, identify the best string from each of the 3 or 4 populations.
2. Play these 3 or 4 against each other for a 50-week repeated game; note average weekly profits.
3. Allowthe 3 or 4 populations to continue co-evolving via the GA.
4. After 100 generations, identify the best strings from the 3 or 4 populations, play them against each other as before; note average weekly profits. 6. Play all combinations of 3 or 4 strategic brands, and consider string-by-string the change in average weekly profits with the sophisticated player and without the sophisticated player in one brand.
7. Repeat steps 5 and 6 for the remaining 2 or 3 strategic brands.
8. Repeat steps 1-7 50 times. We would have expected positive diagonals (i.e., that sophisticates do better), and negative off-diagonals (i.e., that others' profits fall). Instead, we see that the CFON sophisticate is the only one to improve onthe replaced naïve'sperformance. In the cases of Folgers and Maxwell House, the sophisticates did worse than did the naïves. The results of Table 8 are unexpected. One possibility is genetic drift, a phenomenon where lack of selective pressure on manyalleles (sites) on the bit strings (because of convergence of behaviour,generation after generation, which means that only asmall subset of possible states occur,and hence only a small subset of alleles (sites) are triggered) means that those bits may,through chance and recombination, flip, which is only obvious when, in the hurly-burly of rivalry against the naïves, these states are encountered again, after manygenerations, and the perhaps effete sophisticates do not always cut the mustard. We hav e dubbed this the Holyfield-Tyson effect after the notorious championship bout between the twoheavyweights, in which Tyson bit offpart of Holyfield'sear. 9 Genetic drift is inversely proportional to the number of individuals in the population. Weincreased the population size per brand from 25 strings to 250. This led to very slowconvergence, evenwith the short strings in the three-agent, four-action simulations: not only was there a thousand-fold increase in the number of three-way interactions per generation, but there was apparently lengthyspiralling towards convergence of the GA -only a single run was performed, not a Monte Carlo. The GA wasstill converging at 80 generations and the results after 160 generations were no better: the GA had still not converged. Wecannot confirm genetic drift as an explanation.
MANAGERIAL LEARNING
The eight-action sets per player of above were derivedfrom historical actions and so embodied prior learning What if we give the artificial agents a different repertoire of actions -one developed without reference to the historical actions of managers? We used a random experimental design, where the price per pound is stepped in ten-cent increments between $1.60 and $2.80 and feature and display can takeonthe values of either 0 or 100%. Figure 6 shows three patterns that accounted for 39 of 50 Monte Carlo runs. Note that average weekly profits are much higher than with historical, learned action sets. Note too that in general the agents shun low-price promotions and maintain high prices throughout most interactions. The levels of competition are much lower than with historical-action sets -with these randomly chosen action sets the agents are engaging in the sort of collusion that we'dexpected to see in the first simulations above.B ut we speculate that these results showthat inter-chain competition is what our model (and Casper) lacks -the demand curvefor coffee from our supermarket chain must be kinked when potential customers go elsewhere to avoid paying the high prices our artificial agents would liketocharge in implicit collusion.
Results of three-player,eight-possible-action simulations reveal twomajor patterns: much higher average weekly profits, and almost no low, feature pricing, with profits earned at very high pricing. This result is seen in Figure 7 , which shows the patterns for the four strategic players under the three regimes: historical frequencies of the brand managers, co-evolved agents competing against each other,and the best co-evolved agents competing against history.N otice that for Maxwell House and Hills Bros. the co-evolved agents' frequencies of actions are very similar to the historical brand managers' frequencies of actions; and for Folgers and CFON the twopatterns are similar,with a slightly higher shelf price for the historical managers.
CONCLUSION
We can summarise our experiments on rivalry in a mature differentiated Bertrand oligopoly in twoways: the average weekly profits of the agents, and the patterns of actions. Table 6 summarises the average weekly profits of the four strategic brands under the different combinations of strategic brands and four-oreight-action sets (all derived from the historically observed actions of the brand managers). Figure 7 summarises the frequencies of chosen actions (eight-action sets, derivedfrom the historically observed 9 . We should liketothank Bernhard Borges for this name. 
Figure7:
Comparison of Patterns actions) under the three conditions of, first, historical actions (from Figure 1) , second, coev olved agents competing (from Figure 5) , and, third, agents competing against history (playing the 50 best agents per brand against the historical actions of their three competitors). The competitive behaviour of one of our artificial brand managers (Hills Bros.) is similar to the historical frequencies, but the other three artificial brands reveal more strategic behaviour than the historical brands engaged in. Foratleast one brand, a simple set of possible actions and one-week memory are sufficient to simulate historical behaviour,suggesting a lack of sophistication on the part of historical brand managers. Later work will explore this issue of "zero-intelligence" behaviour (or simple heuristics) further.
Our experiments have rev ealed some restrictions on the historical brand managers which were not immediately apparent, but, more significantly,wehav e shown that the patterns of interaction among the brand managers were not as profitable as theymight have been, evenifall strategic players in the oligopoly had been using strategies as finely tuned as our agents had learnt to use, in the simulations learnt using the GA. We hypothesise that the techniques used here could shed light on the behaviours in similar asymmetric oligopolies, and on howthe actors in those markets might have been able to improve their profits in the past and perhaps in the future.
When John Holland (1975) invented the GA, his original term for it was an "adaptive plan" which looked for "improvement" in complexsystems, or "structures which perform well."D espite that, most research effort, particularly outside economics, has been on its use as a function optimiser.B ut, starting with Axelrod (1987) , the GA has increasingly been used as an adaptive search procedure, and latterly as a model of human learning in repeated situations (Duffy 2006 ). In the 1992 second edition of his 1975 monograph, Holland expressed the wish that the GA be seen more as a means of improvement and less on its use as an optimiser.T he work we report on here is an example of the usefulness of the GA in a continuing research program about the behaviour of sellers competing in an oligopoly,where the sellers are modelled as automata responding to the past actions of all sellers.
